Building Sovereignty from a Tricontinental Political Economy

There’s one part that really piqued my interest, which was this graph:

Mapping Contemporary Dependency

Building on this tradition, I have developed a dual analytical framework built around two indices. The Structural Dependency Index (SDI) measures objective constraints across commercial, technological, financial, productive, network, and distributive dimensions – capturing how contemporary dependency operates through the entire circuit of capital. The State Mediating Capacity (SMC) index measures the institutional resources available to navigate these constraints – from public-sector control over strategic sectors to capital-flow regulation and industrial policy intensity.

The intersection of these two dimensions generates what I call the Dependency Map:

A very good article charting the role of the dependency school and it’s relevance in the current multipolar moment.

I think why I find the graph particularly interesting is because of where it situates Malaysia, under non-hegemonic autonomy, vindicating the historical experiences of the Malaysian people and indeed my own thoughts of where the country stands. This is definitely controversial (as can be seen in some articles I have shared before), but I think what the critiques ultimately point to is not extractivism and dependency of the Malaysian Political Economy per se but the limits of the capitalist mode of production to unlock and enable further sovereignty and dignity for the people.

But a key question still stands: how can a capitalist state under a global capitalist economy exert this much autonomy? This, I argue, will be due to the country’s historical development, the state’s class configuration, and present economic structure.

The positions of various sectors from electronics, O&G, rubber, palm oil, food, construction, steel, pharmaceuticals and automotives (Malaysia being the only country in SEA to have national automotive companies, until the rise of VinFast in Vietnam) showcases not only diversification from commodity-based trade in the colonial-era but intentional pivot to building productive forces and institutional independence. The government’s initiatives on Islamic Financial Capital and Halal Industry is an example of the use of religion to build these alternative structures from the neoliberal consensus, to contested and contradictory results.

Both ideologically and materially - the state, being representative of an postcolonial national bourgeoisie, incubated during the 1950s-1970s developmentalist era, had charted a course of sovereignty. The task of the left now is to protect these gains while pushing the envelope further for socialist transition.

Asean+3, not the US, is now the world’s largest market

This structural shift has measurable consequences for how shocks propagate

THE tariffs imposed by the US last year have reignited a familiar narrative: Asia’s export-dependent economies face an existential threat when US consumers pull back.

The story goes that Asean+3 – China, Japan, South Korea and Asean – remains fundamentally a factory floor for Western consumption, vulnerable to any disruption in demand from advanced economies.

This narrative is outdated. The structure of the global economy has shifted in ways that conventional analysis has been slow to recognise. Asean+3 is no longer merely the world’s factory. It has become the world’s largest market.

By 2022, the region accounted for 28 per cent of global final demand, surpassing the US at 26 per cent – a measure derived from value-added analysis, which traces final destinations rather than border crossings.

This is not a statistical curiosity. It represents a fundamental reordering of where global production ultimately gets absorbed.

Two decades ago, nearly a third of Asean+3’s exports serving final demand went to the US. In 2022, that share had fallen to 20 per cent, while intra-regional demand was nearly 30 per cent. Increasingly, Asia is producing for itself.

Contemporary Challenges for the Malaysian Left

To understand the current situation in Malaysia we need a brief overview of the history and political and economic development of the country.

This is quite a comprehensive article, addressing the historical colonial-capitalist plantation economy, the independence movement, debates on race/ethnicity, language, culture, religion and nation-building, industrial policy and resource-based industrialization, ongoing imperialism under a global capitalist economy, and as such the particularities of a state situated in the busiest waterway in the world.

The article is written by the current chairperson of PSM, Jeyakumar Devaraj.

The Parti Sosialis Malaysia (Socialist Party of Malaysia or PSM) is currently the most visible and active left party in Malaysia. However, because of our origins as student activist groups working among plantation workers (largely Indian), currently about 60% of PSM members are Indian. The PSM began working with non-Indian ethnic groups in the late 1990s and our Chinese and Malay membership is increasing gradually. We need many more cadres of all ethnic groups.

For the Left to win here, we have to build a multi-racial party that will finally rewrite the siloed approach of party organization that has plagued the Malaysian Left since the beginning while retaining the working class base of the party.

The Bangkok Bubble

see site for images

Since the American War on Vietnam, Bangkok has been a key hub for international journalists and academics in Southeast Asia. It offers modern infrastructure, easy travel, and a high quality of life, allowing them to chopper into the periphery and return home for drinks. These advantages foster a professional environment removed from the region it purports to cover. Western expatriates operate engulfed within a certain elite social and informational milieu, often resulting in confused, racially essentialist coverage aligning with the interests of the moneyed Bangkok elite.

This was clear during the past six months since the outbreak of the border war with Cambodia last year. This triggered a judicial coup against left-populist PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the installation of Ultra-Right leader Anutin Charnvirakul, the dissolution of parliament, and elections scheduled for February 8th. Foreign correspondents have seemed bemused, writing contradictory pieces. Analysis like BBC’s Jonathan Head’s, citing how much “we just don’t know,” boils mass class-struggle in a country of over 70 million down to petty elite factional rivalries (as is the case with the conflict with Cambodia) and often parrots the Thai elite line. In this instance, the English language coverage was generally anti-Shinawatra, anti-Cambodian and broadly pro-Thai state.

If ignorance is one component, another is racial essentialism. The BBC even published a guide to following racial generalisations in the region. Such analysis is chauvinistic, imperialist, and fundamentally racist. Chief BBC Correspondent Jonathan Head, based in Bangkok for 20 years, exemplifies this; of course he “just doesn’t know” what’s going on, he can’t even speak the language. Meanwhile, any Thai person somewhat versed in socio-political history knows how much we indeed do know, such as the history of the Thai military on the Cambodian border in the past 40 years and the patronage networks that developed as a result.

Unlike cleaner Singapore or more tightly regulated Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok has an aesthetic grit; a few slums, open sex work, and street vendors on crowded pavements. Said vendors often speak basic English, while the elites the foreigners rely on are fluent. This allows the foreign correspondent or researcher the thrill of an edgy, orientalised posting without learning the language or developing a non-Bangkok-centric critique. This network becomes a closed informational loop, dependent on interpreters and fixers from the same consensus, unable to seek dissenting viewpoints outside this circuit.

Financial Times - How Thailand became the ‘sick man’ of Asia

Economists said Thailand would also have to drop protectionist policies, ease restrictions on foreign investment and improve infrastructure to take advantage of potential growth areas such as data centres, high-value manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.

Lol. Just continue doing the same things you have been doing surely that’ll improve the situation.

What Thailand needs is thorough agrarian reform to break down the last remaining feudal relations in the countryside, investments in infrastructure and education throughout the entirety of the country and not just the capital (the Bangkok Metropolitan Area is 50% of GDP with just 25% of the population), active state industrial policy that mandates technological innovation, disciplining if not destruction of the feudal-military rent-seeking state, nationalisation and control of financial capital, and actual import substitution to build up national industry. Foreign investments should be made on a case-by-case basis, based on actual outcomes in employment, productive and technological capacity advancement.

But of course the only classes capable of achieving this is not the one represented in government. No amount of half-arsed reforms that does not touch upon the class contradictions will guarantee the security of the Thai state - all it’s border regions neighbouring Malaysia, Cambodia and Myanmar are bleeding while the large northern and northeastern countryside continuously faces perpetual underdevelopment.

Economic Dogma Blocks Pragmatic Policies - Jomo Kwame Sundaram

A brief article on the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis. As a sidenote, Jomo K.S. is one of the most famous developmental economists in Malaysia, and a major influence of mine.

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Jan 19 2026 (IPS) - After condemning pragmatic responses to the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, the West pursued similar policies in response to the 2008 global financial crisis without acknowledging its own mistakes.

Politicised exchange rates

After US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker sharply raised interest rates from late 1979 to curb inflation, the dollar’s value strengthened despite deepening stagnation.

US exports could barely compete internationally, particularly with Germany and Japan. During his first term, Trump initially pursued a strong dollar policy, which undermined exports and encouraged imports.

The September 1985 ‘Plaza Accord’ among the G7 grouping of the world’s largest economies, held at New York’s Plaza Hotel, agreed that the Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark must both appreciate sharply against the US dollar.

The ‘strong yen’ period, or endaka in Japanese, ensued for a decade until mid-1995. This made Japanese imports less competitive, enabling the Reagan era boom.

By accelerating reunification with the East and the new euro currency, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl prevented the mark strengthening as much as the yen.

Thus, Germany avoided the Japanese catastrophe after its decades-long post-war miracle ended abruptly with the disastrous 1989 Big Bang financial reforms. Related IPS Articles

Thank you for this. It’s something I have tried explaining more concretely in a post I wrote last week.

Your post reminds me of this Substack article written by a Pakistani Marxist-Leninist:

The Emancipation and Sovereignty of the Global South Must Be the Work of the Global South Itself - Bisharat Abbasi

The recurring lament—why did China and Russia not come to rescue Venezuela, why did they not intervene decisively, why did they not confront U.S. imperialism on behalf of a besieged nation—reveals less about China, Russia, or Venezuela than it does about a deep and persistent ideological confusion within large segments of the Global South itself. This confusion is rooted in a residual messianism inherited from colonial modernity: the belief that salvation must come from outside, that history advances through benevolent external guardians, that sovereignty can be subcontracted to friendly great powers. Against this ideological residue, a Marxist–Leninist position—grounded in historical materialism rather than moral sentiment—must insist on a harder, but infinitely more emancipatory truth: the sovereignty of the Global South cannot be gifted, guaranteed, or defended by others; it can only be produced, defended, and consolidated by the Global South itself, through its own class power, its own state form, and its own material capacity for deterrence. Anything else is a return, in new ideological garb, to the old colonial relation of dependence.

When Domenico Losurdo spoke of “proletarian nations,” he was not indulging in poetic metaphor; he was naming a concrete historical reality produced by imperialism itself. Just as capitalism divides societies into antagonistic classes, imperialism divides the world into dominant and dominated nations, into imperialist cores and exploited peripheries. The Global South, in this sense, occupies the position of the proletariat at the world scale: dispossessed of surplus, structurally subordinated, and subjected to permanent coercion—economic, political, and military. To expect that emancipation for these proletarian nations will arrive through the voluntary sacrifice of other states, however friendly, is to misunderstand the nature of the international system under imperialism. States do not act as moral abstractions; they act as historically situated concentrations of class forces, constrained by their own survival, contradictions, and strategic limits.

This is precisely why the question “Why didn’t China and Russia come to save Venezuela?” is itself wrongly posed. China and Russia, whatever their contradictions and internal trajectories, are sovereign states operating within a world order still dominated by imperialist violence. They can provide diplomatic cover, economic cooperation, limited military-technical assistance, and strategic balancing—but they cannot, and will not, risk a direct nuclear confrontation with United States in order to substitute for the internal class power that alone can secure Venezuelan sovereignty. To demand such a sacrifice is not internationalism; it is political infantilism masquerading as radicalism. Genuine internationalism strengthens the capacity of oppressed nations to stand on their own feet; it does not turn them into permanent wards of external protectors.

It continues further but it more or less aligns with what you have just said.

Not sure how this argument stands when the 1998 Indonesian race riots following the Asian Financial Crisis specifically targeted ethnic Chinese in the country.

This is about maintaining national sovereignty under imperialist attack. Yes the targeting is bad, and yes it’s is despicable that there is a community of Chinese Indonesians in China itself after the AFC due to the attacks. But my point is, we don’t live in ideal circumstances.

Stabilizing doesn’t necessarily mean it won’t flare up, I just mean it doesn’t get out of control to the point of mass migrations, which has happened in Vietnam, or state collapse, like with Burma. Clearly not perfect, but Indonesia has to deal with hundreds of ethnic groups with more than 700 spoken languages. A unified state, through the upgrading of productive forces, is better able to defend the interests of the masses, of all ethnic groups.

The Indonesian Chinese bourgeoisie more or less remained scott free compared to many Chinese petty bourgeois and workers due to what had happened. It’s an unfortunate reality. At the same time, Indonesia’s ability to monopolize violence within it’s own borders limited the spread of Wahhabist-Salafists, which is heavily present in the Philippines. To use another example, wouldn’t Prabowo’s policy of free school meals also benefit the “Chindo” masses? I am not saying that diplomatic relations ultimately solves every single ethnic issue in the region, but the sort of back channel diplomacy kept it from boiling over and making it vulnerable to imperialist attack. In other words, active antagonism by China won’t impact the material conditions that give rise to sinophobia in Indonesia, but may just push Indonesia to Western arms.

It’s sad that it’s come to such a state for sure, but it’s looking at things long-term.

And let’s not forget that Malaysian leaders (e.g. UMNO) would periodically raise the 513 incident(race riot against ethnic Chinese in Malaysia) over the years to scare their electorates into voting for the Malay supremacist factions.

That is true, but the race riots are also raised by opposition groups for voting. The opportunism goes both ways.

One could also play the same game about the 1964 race riots in Singapore (which was started by Chinese people), which the PAP continuously leverages as risk against racial harmony and implicitly casts blame on the Muslim minority for not being tolerant enough. I am of the opinion that LKY was a Chinese supremacist, but fully admit that most policies under his helm of Singapore were not carried out entirely out of racism- life’s more complicated than that - and that the current state mostly keeps racial troubles under wraps.

My point is, the sort of race riots that was tumultuous during the early years of Malaya can’t happen now, especially since China’s ascendancy. China’s economic rise indirectly and directly disincentivises such events from occurring, both diplomatically, and also materially.

Isn’t it weird that after the 1974 recognition, there was never an equivalent to the 1969 / 513 riots in scope? Even under the NEP that was instituted after the riots, studies has shown that while the top 10% of Chinese earners did not grow in income, most of the poor across all ethnic groups did, but the biggest benefactor was the Malay-Muslim bourgeoise, admittedly. This elevation of the productive forces is what Indonesia also needs.

The inter-ethnic situation in SEA is nowhere near as congenial as portrayed here. After all, PAS (Islamic fundamentalists) continues to command strong political influence in Malaysia and the inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions are far from being settled.

You take political fanfare for actual racism. There are legitimate concerns and some level of legal barriers against various communities in Malaysia, but we must ask ourselves what is the primary contradiction?

Let’s look at a simple statistics

Life Expectancy: Malay: 74.4; Bumiputera (other): 74.4; Chinese: 77.3; Indian: 71.8; Non-citizens: 82.1

Absolute Poverty rate: Bumiputera: 6.6%; Chinese: 1.5%; Indian: 3.4%

I wish I can abolish racism instantly, and the MCP thought race would disappear after independence. Stability does not mean purity or congeniality as you put it, I just say it is at a manageable state that can more easily by leveraged by a mass movement for genuine material redistribution.

And on the note about PAS - the party had an interesting history. Did you know that PAS and the MCP had a working relationship before independence? And that the DAP was to the right of both PAS and the MCP? I think with this historical knowledge in mind, modern-day race-baiting of PAS and DAP from across the political aisle loses their heft.

I think fears of a “Islamist” takeover which will reignite a 513 like incident a far reach - precisely because material conditions has changed. Islamaphobia among the Chinese middle classes is not brand new, and is also a selling rhetoric among urban Chinese Malaysian circles that has gain further credence due to global political events. This has also hampered efforts for racial unity.

To end, I’d like to reiterate, what is the primary contradiction? with reference to party lines.

PSM:

Entrenched social divisions along ethnic sentiments are not something which naturally exist among the Malaysian masses. Instead, they were historically developed when the class political power held by the Left was destroyed by the colonial British and Malayan/Malaysian government formed of mono-ethnic parties after Merdeka. In the 1960s, although governments were formed by ethnic parties (UMNO, MCA, and MIC), these racial sentiments were still successfully challenged by the Left. Socialist Front (SF), which was an alliance of the Labour Party (Parti Buruh) and the Citizen’s Party (Parti Rakyat). SF brought with it analysis based on socio-economic class, successfully bringing about anti-racial politics as an antidote for the toxic racial politics practised by BN/Perikatan.

Unfortunately, SF was destroyed by ISA arrests, until the anti-racial political narrative was extinguished. After that, the developments presided over by parties like DAP and PAS, which only reflected the political struggles of single races / religions, reflected those of the ruling political bloc. Since then, Malaysian citizens have only been exposed to chauvinist racial narratives for 50 years, until today.

The need for PSM to build a Marhaen (working class) movement in Bumiputera society

If we want to establish a progessive movement that can win power on a Federal level in the future, we need to build a multiracial citizen’s movement.

The reality now is, the primary domestic contradiction is between the national bourgeoisie of all races against the multiracial working class. Racial/ethnic discrimination may constitute secondary or tertiary contradictions, but it may should not hamper the strategy of building a multiracial working class movement.

I think understanding this tweet thread is essential in understanding racial dynamics across the Straits and foreign policy wrt to China.

China’s minority policy actually looks closer to Singapore’s model than people in the West like to admit.

In both systems:

1. minority groups have explicit protections baked into state policy,

2. quotas exist (education, housing, representation) that disproportionately benefit minorities,

3. and the state actively monitors citizens for extremism or chauvinism, not just separatism.

What’s often missed is who Singapore identified early on as its biggest long-term risk: Chinese chauvinism from the majority population. That insight is underrated.

Singapore understood that in a multiethnic society where one group is numerically and economically dominant, the main destabilising force isn’t minorities asserting identity, it’s actually the majority turning dominance into entitlement. So the system was designed to restrain the majority as much as protect minorities.

…

The uncomfortable takeaway is this: states that actually govern multiethnic societies seriously tend to fear the majority’s excesses more than minority identity… because historically, that’s what breaks countries.

One thing I try to do with my posts is explain the political and economic dynamics in SEA through the experience of the peoples and movements in the region. Obviously cultural translation can never be fully accurate, and so by very nature I tend to over emphasize certain aspects (that are also my own biases) so that foreign readers can better understand the context and practice of the Political Economy in SEA. But to refer to history, the Straits of Melaka have always historically been the cosmopolitan crossroads of various civilizations throughout millenia. This makes it a bit easier in one regard, as obviously through colonialism, we have been exposed to ‘Western civilisation’, but also complicates the picture as pre-existing forms of production and civilisation were remolded and reconfigured in the slow march toward global Capitalism.

From How Japan Colonized the Mind: Taiwan’s Managed Memory of Empire

This brings us back to the central question: Why is Japan remembered far more positively in Taiwan than in Korea, despite the exploitative nature of its colonial administration?

One key difference lies in the structure of each society prior to colonization. Taiwan’s population largely comprised migrants from mainland China, and much of the island’s land was held by local landlords. Korea, by contrast, had a deeply entrenched aristocracy and royal landholding system. When Japan annexed Korea, it nationalized land held by the Korean aristocracy and royal family, subsequently concentrating land ownership in the hands of Japanese capitalists. This radical dispossession fueled resentment and intensified resistance, making Korea far more difficult to govern.

The industrialization process in the Philippines has followed a trajectory of initial progress followed by setbacks. Among ASEAN Four, the Philippines initiated its industrialization process the earliest. Before the 1960s, the Philippines’ economic strength in East Asia was second only to Japan, surpassing Singapore, South Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries. In 1960, the manufacturing sector accounted for 20% of its GDP (compared to 34% in Japan and 12% in Singapore), earning the Philippines the status of a quasi-advanced industrialized nation. However, due to factors such as constraints from the domestic bureaucratic political system, prolonged political instability, exploitation of industrial wealth by U.S. multinational corporations, and the protection of vested interests by domestic elites, the Philippines’ economic development has been overtaken by the Asian NIEs, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia over the past half-century. It has transitioned from being the second industrial nation in East Asia to becoming the largest agricultural country, presenting typical characteristics of “deindustrialization” (Shen 2017).

In Malaysia, the government, keenly aware what had happened in other countries after removal of fuel subsidies, implemented a technocratic programme that ensured only Malaysians were able to access it. This would limit smuggling to Thailand and Singapore, as Malaysia notoriously has the lowest cost of fuel (and electricity) in ASEAN.

In September 2025, the Malaysian government announced a scheme called BUDI95, which allows Malaysians to buy RON95 fuel at a subsidised rate of RM1.99 a litre.

So the government actually even decreased the price of fuel from RM2.05 to RM1.99 with the introduction of this new scheme.

quote

“Before the end of September, I will ensure the implementation of fuel price reduction to RM1.99 per liter. ” – Anwar Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia. As a comparison, the pricing for RON95 petrol at the moment is RM2.05 per litre. The new price will be implemented before the end of September 2025.

But this subsidy is limited to Malaysian citizens with valid MyKad identity cards and Malaysia-registered vehicles, with a monthly cap of 300 litres.

Uncited quotes taken from a news article of a Singaporean permanent resident purposefully modifying his number plate.

In 2023, it was noted

Anwar, who is also Finance Minister, said the expenditure on subsidies under Budget 2024 was expected to increase to RM81 billion compared to RM64 billion under Budget 2023 due to the government’s move to maintain the prices of subsidised goods despite the unusual hike in world commodity prices.

“Although subsidised goods help the people to minimise the cost of living, the fact is that subsidies benefit the rich more and low prices have increased leakages and the smuggling of goods out of the country. In fact, subsidies are also enjoyed by more than 3.5 million foreigners.

“The savings from this subsidy (rationalisation) will be partly used to increase cash aid allocations through Sumbangan Tunai Rahmah from RM8 billion to RM10 bilion,” he said when tabling the Malaysia MADANI Budget 2024 in the Dewan Rakyat today.

By 2026, the government has further expanded the cash transfer scheme.

Anwar said the RM100 one-off SARA disbursement was timed to coincide with the Lunar New Year celebrations.

To put into context, RM100 is about 20USD, enough food for a few days for 1 person.

All Malaysian citizens qualify for the programme, although the indiscriminate aid has drawn criticism from some development economists, who said it would have been better to raise assistance slightly for low-income households only.

The Ministry of Finance (MOF) said in a statement issued shortly after Anwar’s announcement that the RM150 million in unused SARA allocations would be redistributed to low-income households.

Meanwhile, RM1.1 billion for the first phase of STR 2026 will be disbursed beginning January 20. MOF said the programme would benefit three million families and 1.3 million elderly people.

This all was enabled because every Malaysian citizen is required by law to have an Identity Card, which also enables the government to more easily target lower income households through their records.

I don’t like the sanctimonious tone people here talk about China, but let me address this

the Filipino government rather than the Maoist guerillas.

You mean the CPP-NPA who after more than 50 years of existence isn’t coming close to achieving it’s aims?

The party faced (and continues to face) critique from both the right and left flanks of the Left in the Philippines and failed to get a mass mandate, resorting to adventurist attacks that provided legal justification of the government to enact martial law and securitization of the Southern provinces.

When the previous party leader was exiled into the Netherlands, why didn’t they think of resigning when they are clearly divorced from ground realities while living in the former colonizer of one of their neighbouring counties?

It’s realpolitik in as much as it is proletarian internationalism (which is a false dichotomy in my opinion), where people have to ask - does the CPP-NPA represent the vanguard of the Philippine working masses? And I think a sober assessment of the party would not be in favour.

MROnline - ASEAN Summit 2025: Imperialism, Monetary Subservience, and Racial/Class Divisions

I personally do not agree with the presumptions of the article fully, especially it’s characterizations of ASEAN since the ascension of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (ie. since the 21st century). If the organisation was still reliving it’s anti-communist legacy, then why would ostensibly communist Laos and Vietnam join it? (Among I think a general overemphasis of neocolonialism.)

The section below I think covers the most important bit of the article

Mini–Plaza Accords? The 2025 US-Malaysia and US-Thailand Agreements

In October 2025, Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) announced that it would begin sharing semiannual foreign exchange data with the US Treasury, as part of the US-Malaysia deal. This statement was cloaked in the familiar bureaucratic language of “transparency” and “good governance.” For the first time, Washington will receive a delayed but detailed view of how and when Kuala Lumpur defends the ringgit. The move comes alongside a parallel agreement with the Bank of Thailand, and together they signal the emergence of what might be called a series of modern “mini–Plaza Accords”: arrangements that update the logic of the 1985 Plaza Accord, for a world in which the United States continues to deepen its rule through audit.

Unlike the spectacle of the original Plaza meeting, these new accords do not formally dictate exchange-rate realignments but rather achieve compliance through surveillance. The governments view their participation not only as a way of avoiding the (largely rhetorical) stigma of being labelled “currency manipulators,” but as a means of preserving their own domestic hierarchies.

The timing of these mini-Plazas is no coincidence. Across the Global South, the dollar’s supremacy is under challenge. China and Russia now settle a significant part of their trade in their own currencies; BRICS members are considering building new clearing systems; and central banks across the global South are considering diversifying their reserves. By binding Malaysia and Thailand into permanent data-exchange relationships, the US Treasury is keen to ensure that any regional shift toward renminbi settlement remains observable and, by extension, punishable.

The American ability to impose penalties on central banks completes the picture. Once a central bank begins sharing detailed foreign exchange data with the US Treasury, the bank effectively enters the orbit of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Aggregated transaction data, even with a time lag, provides Washington with the intelligence needed to detect sanction-evasion patterns. Malaysia’s financial system sits astride trade routes linking China, Iran, and Russia; its banks clear vast amounts of dollar-denominated trade. Under the new framework, Malaysia cannot easily plead neutrality. The awareness that Treasury analysts are watching will ensure that banks over-comply and that regulators self-censor. Sanctions enforcement thus becomes decentralized and invisible, accomplished not through threats but through anticipation of scrutiny and discipline.

The logic resembles the hard dollarization experiment unfolding in Argentina under Javier Milei. There, sovereignty is being surrendered openly, with the promise that adopting the US currency will deliver stability. Malaysia and Thailand offer a softer version of the same faith. They retain their own currencies but outsource discretion, turning their central banks into reporting agents and effectively “financial intelligence units” within the wider dollar system. The difference between Argentina and Malaysia is one of degree rather than kind, since both subscribe to a theology that equates dependence with economic progress.

For Southeast Asia, the implications are profound. Singapore has long been Washington’s principal compliance hub; now Malaysia and Thailand are being woven into the same enforcement matrix, ensuring that ASEAN’s financial channels remain clean of transactions deemed suspicious by Western standards. Indonesia and Vietnam, as their ties with China deepen, will face similar pressure. What appears to be a benign commitment to data-sharing is in fact the construction of a regional hierarchy of compliance. The governments of Malaysia and Thailand have conscripted themselves, seeking safety in the very structure that limits them.

Vietnam is already seen as part of the Sino world, only Westerners think otherwise. The (derogatory?) implications of being cast as Southeast Asian is noted though - very typical for these sort of commentators.

In reality Southeast Asia doesn’t exist, and even if it did, it’d be split into three parts, Maritime Southeast Asia (Nusantara/the Malay World), Mainland Southeast Asia (buddhist regions stretching from Burma to Laos), and Vietnam. This is due to history. Only international school kids and liberals think of themselves as “southeast asian”. I use it purely as a geographical marker but without claim to any pretensions of a larger cultural unity.

Thailand’s manufacturing industry is suffering but it is still the second largest in the Southeast Asia. The main point of contention is this recency bias - “factionalism of the past 20-30years” - which showcases the sort of fake analysis so common these days. It may sound profound but doesn’t actually tell you much. Like saying “just pursue manufacturing bro”.

Questions people should be asking:

• what was different about Thailand’s industrial policy from the other Asian tigers?
• Why did tourism become the main source of livelihoods, especially in rural areas and the islands?
• What were the class structures that influenced the behaviour of state, industrial and financial capital throughout 20th and 21st century Thailand?
• What was the role of China, the world bank and IMF in the Asian Financial Crisis that affected Thailand first?

Vietnam is likely to become the last country in the world to go from poor to developed

???

OP is basing “poor” and “development” just on GDP per capita figures and thinks that is be end and end all of “development”. But I can’t expect much from someone who the day before was doing psychoanalysis about Maduro having to switch from a life of luxury to living in US prisons and implying he might suicide lol and that instead of being addicted to power you should just become a merchant (the irony of someone saying that an advocating for manufacturing is not lost on me).

It’s all vibes based analysis from these people.

Anwar’s statement

I have followed developments in Venezuela with grave concern. The leader of Venezuela and his wife were seized in a United States military operation of unusual scope and nature. Such actions constitute a clear violation of international law and amount to an unlawful use of force against a sovereign state.

President Maduro and his wife must be released without any undue delay. Whatever may be the reasons, the forcible removal of a sitting head of government through external action sets a dangerous precedent. It erodes fundamental restraints on the use of power between states and weakens the legal framework that underpins international order.

It is for the people of Venezuela to determine their own political future. As history has shown, abrupt changes in leadership brought about through external force will bring more harm than good, what more in a country already grappling with prolonged economic hardship and deep social strain.

Malaysia regards respect for international law and sovereignty as paramount to peaceful relations between states. Constructive engagement, dialogue and de-escalation remain the most credible path towards an outcome that protects civilians and allows Venezuelans to pursue their legitimate aspirations without further harm.

This response is expected for anyone bothered to read the country’s history in the last 50 years instead of repeating old retellings of anti-communist things that happened 70 years ago.

Westerners mad that global south countries do not recognize unilateral sanctions nor care about liberal antics. Personally, I applaud the industrious and entrepreneurial spirit of all the people involved in the transhipment of Venezeulan and Iranian oil in Malaysian waters.

So what you’re saying is… infrastructure buildup requires long-term engagement and investment? It’s not like the funny paradox game where after capturing the war goal/capital I can just take all their resources?

‘Dead’ town: At Kelantan-Thailand border, Malaysia’s drug war unsettles residents, businesses

Malaysia is building both walls and bridges along its porous northern border with Thailand, determined to deter rampant smuggling while boosting economic ties. In the first of a two-part series, CNA explores how Malaysia is preventing illicit goods from reaching its shores, and the ground impact of these efforts.

Context being the Northern rural states also have the highest drug addiction rates in the country. Economic development and curtailing flow forms part of the strategy to eradicate substance (mis)use since the border up North is where most drugs enter Peninsular Malaysia.

New border bridge, rail link: Malaysia, Thailand eye deeper economic ties in border regions, but hurdles remain

In the second of a two-part series, CNA looks at joint economic projects in the pipeline, and how political and security challenges might scupper them.

There’s video versions of the articles aswell. Very hefty articles, providing accounts from officials and locals from both sides of the border, talking about the economy, building walls, bridges, railway, bombings and smuggling. The counter-insurgency narrative is a given for something coming from Mediacorp, but the history of the BRN (National Revolutionary Front) and the role of (political) Islam in the Southern Thai provinces and Northern Malaysian states is too much to talk about here.

Random things I found interesting

“Malaysians are coming to the Thai border towns and purchasing chicken burgers until the shelves are empty,” he said, his voice tinged with astonishment as he referred to the ready-to-eat snack easily prepared in a microwave.

When my family visited Thailand last month, they brought over atleast like 12 of these burgers. The fridge was full of them. They do taste pretty good - slightly better than the McDonald ones, and about 1usd each so way cheaper. Didn’t realize it was a trendy thing to do.

As for transportation links, Malaysia and Thailand have agreed to revive the Bangkok-Butterworth train service on the west coast. There is also talk of extending Malaysia’s upcoming East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) to Thailand via Rantau Panjang and Sungai Golok.

If the new double tracking proposals for Thailand’s Southern provinces comes through, this will leave the last bottleneck of the Singapore-Kunming line resolved (…by 2031).

The limits of reform: 2025 Malaysia news roundup

Malaysia’s Prime Minister is more akin to that of Lula, but this may not seem immediately obvious due to the nature of the respective countries in the capitalist world economy. The centrist coalition, incapable at mobilising structural changes in the economy, resorts to small reforms to stitch over the wounds while delaying the inevitable.

Increases in the minimum wage, instituting a voluntary progressive wage policy and civil servant salary raises were parts of the government’s policy in improving salaries after decades of continual stagnation. Greater push for TVET education and gradual educational reform, with emphasis on STEM and trilingual mastery of Malay, English and Mandarin, has continuously been the government’s strategy in marketing the labour force to international capital. Malaysia has one of the highest % of STEM graduates in Southeast Asia, with about 40% according to some sources. Enrolment has reached 51%, with the government long-term goal being 60%. Coupled with this is record highs in cash handout spending to lower income households in 2025, funded through fuel subsidy rationalisation.

The government has continuously pursued a reduction of the fiscal deficit, as emphasized in the 13th Malaysia Plan (the 2026-2030 5-year plan). Personally, it seems like local conversations and media has finally shifted from scaremongering about the deficit the past couple years, recognising that the government’s exposure to foreign-denominated debt has always been low (<3%), with overall public sector external debt being ~10%.

The high-profile case involving Former Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, has reached it’s conclusion with a 15-year jail time and a RM11.38b ($2.8b) fine due to his role in the 1MDB corruption scandal. That said, some major actors remain free and other people involved were able to avoid harsh penalties, questioning the government’s ability and willingness to root out corruption.

The signing of the US-Malaysia ART, widely criticised for being unbalanced and unfavourable to Malaysia, was also signed. Among the provisions that were critiqued include those forcing Malaysia to conform to US rare earth supply chains, acceptance of US Halal certification standards, and a clause involving unilateral tariffs against US enemies.

Other various tidbits

Malaysia has overtaken Thailand since 2024 to become the most visited country in Southeast Asia, with preliminary assessments indicating more than 40 million visitors in 2025, with 2026 plan’s seeing the government’s target rise to 47 million. Foreign and domestic tourist spending has exceeded 2019 levels.

The Malaysian Ringgit has reached a nearly 5 year high against the dollar, trading at around 4.04-4.06. Trade has also risen to it’s highest level ever, with RM1.45t ($358b) in exports by November. This means a record consecutive export surplus of 67 months since May 2020, and leading to another yearly surplus since 1998.

Looking at various statistics on OpenDOSM, the government’s bid for a fully transparent platform of free, regularly updated and open data unifying sources from all government agencies, does imply some ‘progress’.

For example, FDI

Conclusion

All in all, 2025 was marked by competence by the national bourgeois dictatorship, further cementing Malaysia’s role and reliance on the global economy. Mixtures of neoliberal, and progressive policies further complicate Malaysia’s future trajectory. 2026 will be a pivotal year in assessing ASEAN’s role in the global economy, whether it can successfully build South-South cooperation and retain unity and resilience from ongoing geopolitical fragmentation. Ongoing adherence to neoliberal capitalism limits future imaginations, continues enabling the desecration of class politics into technocratic managerial politics of “good governance”. The political Left remains practically non-existent in this suffocating existence, with the necessary work continuously and slowly being built by those on the ground.

That’s all, and happy new years everyone.

I share similar fears, but what can China do that it hasn’t already done?

As much as the sabre-rattling of China’s incursions in the contested South China Sea is amplified, China does not have the precedence of military deployments as the USA has in their neighbouring regions.

I think local developments will have to shift before any sort of overt policy change comes into play. The militaries of Southeast Asian countries are generally more reactionary and anti-China than the populace, any sort of official movement of China’s military may lead to unnecessary antagonisms elsewhere.

Simple narratives of interference by China is already widespread. I think their focus on the economy and diplomacy has carried itself to good graces for most of Southeast Asia so far. It’s about bread and butter issues for the populace in the end- China has the economic weight that Russia does not.